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Abstract
  We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps & Scheinkman [83] in the address
model of horizontal differentiation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first
stage and then compete in price. We show that price competition is drastically soften since in
almost all subgame perfect equilibrium, firms behave as if they were an integrated monopoly i.e.,
choose capacities which exactly cover the market, so that there is no room for price competition. If
furthermore the installation cost for capacity is one fourth of the transportation cost, then this result
stands for all SPE. Like Kreps & Scheinkman, we show that the Cournot allocations (quantity
competition) coincide with the SPE allocations of our game form. Finally our analysis provides an
interesting treatment of mixed strategies equilibria which is quite new in this literature.
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1) Introduction
The intuition according to which price competition yields lower equilibrium mark-ups than
quantity competition has been definitely illustrated by the Bertrand [1883] critique of Cournot
[1838] analysis. The comparison of these two models conveys a very simple message : equilibrium
outcomes in oligopolistic industries crucially depend on the nature of the strategic variable. It is
however fair to say that both models suffer from important limitations. The main drawback of
quantity setting models is that no explicit price mechanism is stipulated. On the other hand, allowing
firms to set prices leads to the Bertrand result, if and only if firms face constant marginal costs. As
shown by Edgeworth [25], no pure strategy equilibrium exists in the Bertrand model with increasing
marginal costs. An important by-product of Edgeworth's analysis is that firms' payoffs in a mixed
strategy equilibrium are positive, so that firms could find it profitable to voluntarily limit their
production capacities, in order to depart from the Bertrand outcomes. This provides the intuition
underlying the result established by Kreps & Scheinkman [83]. They showed that in a two-stage
game where firms precommit to capacities and then compete in prices, Cournot outcomes could
prevail as the unique SPE outcome. In addition to reconciling Bertrand and Cournot competition
into a single framework, this result essentially suggests that quantity precommitment is a natural
way out of a too fierce price competition.
In order to depart from the Bertrand outcome, Hotelling [29] followed a completely different
route. Sticking to a price competition framework, he showed that firms could secure positive profits
in equilibrium by differentiating their products. Interestingly enough, he thought that product
differentiation would solve both the Bertrand and the Edgeworth problem. To quote Hotelling [29],
p 471 : "The assumption, implicit in Cournot, Amoroso and Edgeworth's work that all buyers deal
with the cheapest seller leads to a type of instability which disappears when the quantity sold is
considered as a continuous function of the differences in prices". Although he was clearly right in
arguing that continuous demand would solve the Bertrand paradox, he was wrong on the
Edgeworth's front. As shown by Shapley & Shubik [69] or McLeod [85], product differentiation is
not sufficient to restore the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a pricing game with
increasing marginal costs. Indeed, the presence of quantitative restrictions in the pricing game
typically yields non quasi-concave payoffs and these migth preclude the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium. Existence conditions  have then been investigated by Friedman [88], Benassy [89] and
Canoy [96] for price setting models of product differentiation.
However, the incentives to voluntarily limit production capacities have been completely
neglected in a context of product differentiation. This is remarkable because it is clear that firms'
incentives to relax price competition through some form of quantitative restrictions do not disappear
due to product differentiation. For instance, at the equilibrium prices in the Hotelling model, all
consumers enjoy a strictly positive surplus. Therefore, firms could sell exactly the same amount at
higher prices, thereby enjoying higher profits. In this sense, prices are too low in the Hotelling
equilibrium and there is room for relaxing price competition further through capacity limitations.3
Addressing this question is the aim of the present paper. To this end, we apply the Kreps &
Scheinkman framework to the Hotelling model i.e., firms precommit to capacities and then compete
in prices in an horizontally differentiated market.
Our main results are the following. In a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), capacity
precommitment softens price competition, as in Kreps & Scheinkman but more drastically : the
capacity choices exactly cover the market, so that there is no room for price competition at all, the
only degree of freedom being the sharing of the market. The intuition behind this result is that if
capacity choices overlap, at least one firm will reduce its capacity to the complement of its
competitor, the reason being that its second stage payoff does not depend on its first stage strategy
(capacity). The foundation of this result is that capacity precommitment enables firms to take
advantage of the local monopoly structure inherent to the Hotelling model. Note that our result is
not driven by the existence of costs for capacity installation ; this cost must be positive but can be
arbitrarily small relative to the other parameters of the game. We must mention however the
existence of other SPE's for a small set of values of the reservation price involving excess capacities
and mixed strategies in the pricing game ; however, they appear only only for low installation cost.
Finally, we show that the SPE's involving exact market coverage are the outcomes of Cournot
competition, thus we provide an analog of Kreps & Scheinkman's statement to horizontally
differentiated market.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic model and the
equilibrium when firms do not face limited capacities. Section 3 presents the main intuitions
underlying the analysis of price competition with capacity constraints in the Hotelling model. In
section 4, we study the various kind of price subgames. The capacity game is then solved in section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2) The Hotelling model without capacity
constraints
We introduce the address model of Hotelling with fixed locations (this point shall never
change) and capacities and analyse the resulting price competition.
An indivisible homogeneous good is sold by two shops located at the boundaries1 of the [0;1]
segment along which consumers are uniformly distributed. Each consumer is identified by its
address x in the street. An agent buy at most one unit of the good, the common reservation price is
S. When buying one of the products, the consumer goes to a shop and bears a transportation cost
linear in the distance to the shop. Since we can normalise prices, we set the transportation cost
between the two shops at 1$. The utility derived by a consumer located at x in the interval [0,1] is
1 We choose maximum differentiation to relax as much as possible price competition . If firms find it profitable to
further relax  price competition through capacity precommitment, it is likely that they would face even greater incentives
if they were less horizontally differentiated.4
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  Refraining from consuming any of the two products yields a nil level of utility2. Although
being a fairly standard result, we first characterise the Hotelling equilibrium in full length. Indeed,
this will provide a useful benchmark for the analysis to follow.
Proposition 1 (Hotelling)
If S > 3/2 and firms face no capacity constraints, the only Nash equilibrium of the
pricing game is (1,1) and the market is covered.
 Proof  As one can see with the plain lines of
figure 1, if prices are not too large, all agents
buy the good at one of the shops. Those living in
the segment  0 12 ;˜(, ) xp p []  will buy at firm 1
whose demand is thus ˜(, ) xp p 12  as consumers
are uniformly distributed on [0;1]. Likewise, the
demand addressed to firm 2 is 1 12 − ˜(, ) xp p .
x
S − x − p1
0 1 ˜ x(p1,p 2)
S − (1 − x) − p2
Utility
Figure 1







 i.e., the solution of
Sxp S x p −− =−− − 12 1 (). It is also clear from the dashed lines of figure 1 that the market is not
covered if prices are too large. In that case, firm3 i is a local monopoly and her demand is
min , 1S p i − {} , this happens if Sx p p p ij i −− < ˜(,) 0 ⇔>− − pS p i j 21 .
The demand function of firm i is D pp
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Since Di(pi,pj) is piecewise linear and decreasing in pj, the profit function is concave in pj so
that the best reply to a mixed strategy is the best reply to its expectation which is a pure strategy.
Therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium of this pricing game is pure.
2 In Hotelling's original model, this possibility is not considered, formally, this correspond to an infinite S.
3 In the remainder of the text, i stands for either of the firm and j for her competitor.5
The best reply of the domestic firm,
BRd, is displayed in bold and dashed on
figure 2 while that of the foreign firm is
displayed in bold and plain. BRd follows the
classical best reply H(pf) for low pf's until it
leads to an uncovered market. From that point
on, BRd decreases along the frontier until it
reaches the monopoly price pm. The best
reply lines intersect at the unit price for both
firms as soon as S > 3/2. Otherwise, there is a
continüm of equilibria on the frontier which
entail no "real" price competition.♦
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Observe that the equilibrium prices do not depend on S and are "too low" in the sense that all
consumers enjoy a strictly positive surplus. Clearly, firms could benefit from using capacity pre-
commitment in order to relax the price competition.
3) Capacity pre-commitment
We add a preliminary step to the game of the previous section : firms choose simultaneously
sales capacity k1 and k2 and then simultaneously choose prices p1 and p2 knowing the chosen
capacity of their competitor. We are considering a two stage game G that is analysed using subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. The subgame after the choices of k1 and k2 is denoted G(k1,k2) and called
the pricing game.
Definition : A strategy of firm i in G is a capacity ki and a function σi assigning to any couple of
capacities (ki,kj) a pricing strategy σi(ki,kj) which is a probability measure over the positive prices.
A subgame perfect equilibrium is a quadruple  m m 12 1 2 , , (.,.), (.,.) σσ ()  such that in every subgame
G(ki,kj), including the equilibrium path G(mi,mj), the pricing strategy σi(ki,kj) of firm i is a best
reply to σj(ki,kj). Secondly, mi is a best reply to mj, knowing that σi and σj are used in any pricing
game.
The introduction of capacities constraints k1 and k2 complicates the analysis. Indeed, the
presence of limited capacities considerably affects firms' incentives in the pricing game. First, a
limited capacity may decrease the incentive of a firm to reply to the other's price with a low price.
Consider for instance that firm 1 has chosen a capacity k1. When firm 1 is aggressive and sets a price
p1 low relative to p2, she receives a large demand but she is not able to serve all of it as soon as her
capacity k1 is reached ; thus her incentives to price competition are lowered.6
A second observation induced by limited capacities is that some consumers might be
rationed at the prevailing prices. This possibility is the cornerstone of the price competition analysis
as it may reverse firms' incentives in the price game. More precisely, one firm could find it
profitable to quote a high price, anticipating the fact that some consumers will be rationed by the
other firm and could be willing to report their purchase to her. This was the original intuition of
Edgeworth. The incentives for that behaviour basically depend on the willingness of consumers to
switch to the high price firm in case of rationing. The extent to which rationed consumers will be
recovered by this firm directly depends on who the rationed consumers are. Therefore, the
organisation of rationing in the market is of central importance.
We will assume that the efficient rationing rule is at work in the market, as in Kreps &
Scheinkman [83]. Under this rule, rationed consumers are those exhibiting the lowest reservation
price for the good. Consider the example depicted on figure 3.
Some consumers willing to buy
at firm 1 are rationed. Under efficient
rationing, they are located in the interval
kx pp 11 2 ;˜(, ) []  and thus are precisely the
most inclined to switch to firm 2.
Despite firm 2 has a potentially low
demand (p2 is high relative to p1), the
fact that firm 1 is constrained by her
capacity k1, could give firm 2 an
effective demand of 1 − k1.
0 k1 x(p1,p2) 1
Potential demand
       for firm1
Potential demand
       for firm2
Sales of firm 1 Sales of firm 2
    Rationed consumers who
switch from  firm 1 to firm 2
Figure 3
More precisely, as long as p2 is less than S −1+ k1, the net reservation price of the consumer
located in k1, the effective demand of firm 2 is 1 − k1. This feature of the market allocation rule also
lowers firm 2's incentives to enter a price competition "à la Bertrand" since her demand is locally
independent of her own price p2. Note thus that within our framework, efficient rationing defines the
largest residual demand for firm 2, so that, contrarily to Kreps & Scheinkman, the incentives to use
rationing strategically are maximised. This phenomenon will have a strong feedback on the choices
of capacities.
Nevertheless, our study will be meaningful if firms are always lead to choose capacities
whose total exceeds the market size. This way, they will enter into a price competition at the second
stage. Recalling that the total transportation cost from one shop to the other is unity, Proposition 2
clarifies this point.7
Proposition 2
If the unit cost of capacity installation ε is larger than S − 1, the unique SPE entails
monopoly pricing by both firms.
Proof  If firm i has a monopoly over the market and has installed a capacity ki, the demand
addressed to her is f kS p ii i ≡− {} min , . The second period profit pS p ii () −  is maximum for pi =
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. As the second part is decreasing, only the first matters for
the optimal capacity choice which is km ≡ min , 1 2
S− {}
ε . Now, it clear that ε > S − 1 implies km < 1/2
; thus both firms are able to achieve their full monopoly profit without interacting which means that
km is a dominant strategy and thus characterise a unique SPE allocation. ♦
Corollary
If ε < S − 1, then a SPE involves total capacity exceeding the market size.
It is clear that when ε < S − 1, capacity choices "interior" to the market i.e., such that k1 + k2
< 1, are not stable since one of the firm (may be both) has an incentive to choose at least a capacity
completary to her competitor. However, exact market coverage pairs (k1,k2) subject to the constraint
max , kk k m
12 {} ≤ , are candidates to be subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game. The next
section studies the pricing game when the choice of capacities exceed the market size.
4) The price subgame
4.1) The Demand functions
We now proceed to the derivation of demands in the pricing game G(k1,k2) when k1 + k2 > 1
and, without loss of generality, k1 > k2. The intuition underlying the analysis is the following one :
demands are piecewise linear, thus continuous in prices (contrarily to the case of homogenous
goods) but exhibit outward kinks i.e., non concavity. Therefore, the best reply functions are
discontinuous which can preclude the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Nevertheless, payoff
functions are "piecewise" concave, thus firms have only a finite number of best replies and
equilibria are atomic. By this term, we mean that firms use a mixed strategy with a finite support ;
contrarily to the case studied by Kreps & Scheinkman [1983] and Osborne & Pitchik [1986], there is
no density of prices in any equilibrium of the second stage game. This is a property of product
differentiation. The following paragraph which is devoted to the derivation of demand functions is
quite heavy but things become clear on the figure that summarises our findings.8
The rationing rule that we use is the efficient one which means that if the demand addressed
to firm i exceeds ki, she serves the segment [0;ki]. Thus, if we let Di be the sales of firm i, the
demand addressed to firm j is bounded by 1 − Di. Since Di is bounded by the capacity ki and by the
monopoly sales Sp i − , we have Di = min , , Sp k D ii j −− {} 1 =  min , fD i j 1− {}  where fi =
min , kS p ii − {} .
Observe now that  
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 because the demands
addressed to the firms can be served by both. The reverse implication is also true as one can see
from the definition of Di . We now investigate the prices that enables the conditions (E1) and (E2) to
hold.
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conditions (E1) and (E2) are satisfied for prices such that a kp p (,) 12 1 ≤≤   min ( , ), ( ) bk p cp 22 2 {} .
The benchmark δ() kS k i i ≡− is the maximum price compatible with sales of ki while
ρ() kS k j j ≡− + 1  is called the default option as it ensures firm i, a demand of at least 1 − kj
whatever his opponent's price.
As shown on figure 4 below, k1 + k2 > 1 implies a(k1,.) < b(k2,.) and δ(kj) < ρ(ki). Lastly,
a(k1,.) = c(.) = δ(k1) for p2 = ρ(k1) and b(k2,.) = c(.) = ρ(k2) for p2 = δ(k2). The area delimited by










D1 = 1− k2
D2 = k2
D1 = S −p1
D2 = k2
D1 = k1
D2 =1− ˜ x(p1,p2 )
D1 = ˜ x(p1,p2)
D1 = k1
D2 =1− k1
D1 = S −p1
D2 = S −p2
D2 = S −p2
Figure 4
Thanks to figure 4, the demands addressed to the firms are easy to understand. When prices
are similar, they give rise to a point in the band where we have the classical Hotelling demands.
Now, if p1 increases, firm 1 looses sales until firm 2 is constrained by her capacity i.e., we reach the9
upper triangle. From that point on, if p1 increases further, D1 remains constant at 1 − k2. This
conduct last until p1 is so large that the market is not covered anymore and firm 1 obtains a
monopoly demand.
4.2) The best reply functions
We now perform the derivation of the best reply of firm 1 to a price charged by firm 2. We
already assumed S > 1+ ε and we go a step further4 by assuming S > 2 to create a fierce price
competition between the duopolists. Indeed, it basically implies that a lonely monopolist with full
capacity would choose to cover the market (his unconstrained choice would be S/2). Since there are
two firms and only one market, it cannot be the case that the market is left partially uncovered at
equilibrium prices. Whatever their capacity choices, firms will always engage into a price
competition. Technically, it implies S/2 < δ(ki) for all i and all capacities ki and thus S/2 < ρ(ki)
because k1 + k2 > 1.
Lemma 1
Firm i never charge prices above ρ() kS k j j ≡− + 1 , thus strategy spaces are bounded.
Proof Let F1 be the cumulative function of the mixed strategy used by firm 1 in equilibrium. Recall
that  ∀∀≥ = − pp k D p p S p 21 2 1 1 2 1 , ( ), ( , ) ρ . Now, since the monopoly price S/2 is less than ρ(k2),
Π1(p2,.) must be decreasing over [ρ(k2);+∞[ and the same is true for the average Π12 (, . ) F
≡ ∫Π12 22 ( ,.) ( ) p dF p . Therefore F1 as a best reply to F2, has no mass above ρ(k2) and symmetrically
the support of F2 is included in  0 1 ;( ) ρ k [] . ♦
We now study the best reply of firm 1 to a price p2 lesser than ρ(k1) knowing that p1 is itself
lesser than ρ(k2). There are two radically different patterns of behaviour. Either, firm 1 act in a
classical fashion (à la Hotelling) with an agressive price in order to gain market shares or she hides
behind the quota. We mean that she contents herself to serve the part of market that is out of reach
for her opponent i.e., the [0;1 − k2] interval. On this residual demand, firm 1 acts as a monopolist
(this is the key feature of the Hotelling framework) and the optimal price is ρ(k2) ; we call it the
security strategy.
4 Note that the standard analysis of the Hotelling model generally assumes S large enough to ensure market-covering in
equilibrium. A close look at the proofs shows that it is unnecessary but simplifies the exposition of the price equilibrium.10
On the domain of monopoly demand, S/2
< δ(k1) implies that profit is decreasing with p1
over the domain, thus the best choice is first
ρ(k2) and then c(p2). However this latter value is
itself dominated by the argmax of the band. In
the triangle above b and in the triangle under a,
demand is constant so that profit is increasing
and the best choices are respectively ρ(k2) and
a(k1,p2). Again, this latter value is itself















In the band where D1 =  ˜(, ) xp p 12 , profit is quadratic, hence the best choice is either H(.),
a(k1,.) or b(k2,.). As seen on figure 5, H(.) is in the band if b(k2,p2) > H(p2) > a(k1,p2). The first
inequality leads to  p2 > β(k2) ≡ 3 − 4k2 (it is always satisfied if k2 > 3/4 as on figure 5). The second
inequality leads to p2 < α(k1) ≡ 4k1 − 1 (it is never satisfied if k1 < 1/4). Since b(k2,p2) is dominated
by ρ(k2), we can, without loss of generality, take Max H a k (.), ( ,.) 1 {}  to  be the best choice in the
band because we will then choose between this candidate and the security strategy ρ(k2). The profit



























The meaning of the modified Hotelling best reply is that firm 1 responds in an aggressive
manner to any increase of p2 in order to gain market shares. This conduct lasts until her sales reach
her capacity ; above that threshold, she can only sell her full capacity at a maximum price.
The security strategy ρ(k2) generates the profit Πd kSk k () ( ) 22 2 11 ≡− + [] −  which might
dominate  ˆ ( ) Π12 p  against a low price p2 ; more specifically, lemma 3 in the appendix5 shows that
BRp
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Firm 1's best reply function is plotted in
bold on figure 6 (the other lines are used in the
proof of lemma 2 below) ; its particular shape is
intuitive : when the price p2 is low, firm 1 tends
to reply with a high price, thereby benefiting
from the resulting rationing at firm 2. Against a
high price p2, firm 1 fights for market shares.
An intuitve consequence of the previous






5 The cut-off function γ(k1,k2) having no economic meaning, it is not reproduced in the text.11
Lemma 2
In any equilibrium of the pricing game, firms name prices larger than the unit price
characterising the Hotelling equilibrium.
Proof  Observe on figure 6 above, that the best reply of firm 1 is always larger than 1/2 because both
H(.) and ρ(k2) are larger than 1/2. This is due to the fact that Π1(p2,.) is increasing over [0;1/2] for
any price p2. This in turn implies that the average Π1(F2,.) is also increasing over [0;1/2]. Therefore
F1, which is a best reply to F2, puts no mass under 1/2 and by symmetry, this result is also true for
F2.
Now, when looking again at Π1(p2,.), we can restrict ourselves to prices p2 ≥ 1/2 so that
Π1(p2,.)  is increasing over [0;3/4] (cf. figure 6) and so is the average Π1(F2,.). The same optimality
argument now implies that F1 puts no mass under 3/4. Repetition implies that neither F1 nor F2 put
mass under the unit. This argument is also used in lemma 4 of the appendix where it is more
completely developed. ♦
Combining lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain :
Proposition 3
In equilibrium, the support of the mixed strategy Fi is included in [1;ρ(kj)].
4.3) Equilibria of the pricing game
In this sub-section, we characterise the equilibria of the price subgame ; however, analytical
developments are relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 4
The price equilibrium can take either of the following forms :
- A) both firms use the pure strategy at the Hotelling unit price
- B) one firm plays a pure strategy and the other mixes over two atoms
- C) both firms use a mixed strategy involving the same number of "atoms"
Proof  A) Equilibria involving only pure strategies
Assuming that both capacities are arbitrarily close to 1, one could expect that the standard
Hotelling equilibrium of proposition 1 is preserved.12
We show in lemma 3 of the
appendix, the existence of an area A1 of
the (k1,k2) plane (cf. figure 7) where
γ(k1,k2) < 1 ; it consist of large values of
k2 while the symmetrical area A2 where
γ(k2,k1) < 1 consists of large values for
k1. In A1∩A2 which is a square, best
replies curves do indeed cross at (1,1)
which is an equilibrium. We cannot
claim that it is the only one because









B) Equilibria involving a pure strategy and a mixed one
 In the area A1\A2 (large k2 and not so large k1) of figure 7 above, the pure strategy
equilibrium ceases to exists because γ(k1,k2) > 1. To understand the characterisation of type B
equilibrium, it is useful to give the intuition of this result by presenting the Edgeworth cycle in a
market for differentiated products.
If p1 = 1, firm 2 uses the fact
that k1 is not very large to enjoy the
market share 1 − k1 at the maximum
price  ρ(k1) rather than fighting
against p1 = 1 with its "Hotelling"
best reply H(1) = 1. Since there is
actually no competition, the best
reaction of firm 1 is to increase its
price to δ(k1) which is the maximum













Now, both prices are at their peak and the only way to increase profit is to capture new
market shares by undercutting one's opponent price. The next best move of firm 2 is p2 = H(p1),
followed by a low value p1 = H(p2) ; at this moment we are back to the beginning of the story : it is
better for firm 2 to  retreat over its protected share 1 − k1.
According to the Nash definition in this context, the equilibrium sees firm 1 playing the pure








8). The symmetric vector of strategies is not an equilibrium because to make firm 1 indifferent
between ρ(k2) and q1, firm 2 would have to play the pure strategy γ(k1,k2) which is strictly less than13
1 by definition of the area A1\A2, but this contradicts the fact that equilibrium prices are larger than
1. As k2 is "large", the default option is never relevant for firm 1 because it involves nearly zero
profits. Area A2\A1 is entirely symmetric.
Comments
The preceding story should not be criticised for its dynamic presentation of the static concept
of Nash equilibrium. Beyond showing why there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, it helps to
understand the nature of the new equilibrium. When firm 1 plays the pure strategy γ(k2,k1), if firm 2
perceives a slightly larger price, she replies aggressively for sure while if she perceives a slightly
lower price, she plays her default option for sure. Clearly, firm 2 is not throwing a coin to decide on
her pricing strategy, she plays a pure strategy that depends (crucially) on her perception of firm 1's
price.
This interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria is the purification argument of Harsanyi [73] ;
our setting is an example where it fully makes sense. Moreover, the experimental study of Brown-
Kruse & al. [94] suggest that disequilibrium adjustment process (called Edgeworth cycle in their
paper) or mixed strategy equilibria are the most robust theoretical explanation of the observed
pricing pattern in a Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly game.
C) Equilibria involving completely mixed strategies
In our economic model, there exists "Edgeworth" cycles but they need not involve a pure
strategy for one of the firms. Therefore, we should expect the existence of other equilibria where
both firms use mixed strategies ; they are fully characterised in lemmas 4 and 5 of the appendix.
Note that their existence is not related to areas A1 and A2.
The most important technical characteristic of our model is that, because of the piecewise
linearity of the demand functions, firms do not use densities and furthermore the support of their
mixed strategies contain the same number of atoms. Therefore an n atom equilibrium is a quadruple
pp mmmm
1212 ,,, μμ ()
≤ mn
 where μi
m is the weight put by firm i on her mth atom pi
m (prices are ranked
by increasing order). To derive an n atom equilibrium of the pricing game G(k1,k2), we first solve
numerically6 a system of 2n − 2 polynomial equations in 2n − 2 variables and then check two
conditions on the vector of prices derived from the system in relation to k1, k2 and S i.e., we
eliminate some capacity points whose associated candidate equilibria violate one of those
conditions.
The symmetry of the problem enables us to limit ourselves to the case where k1 > k2. The
first necessary condition (cf. lemma 5 in appendix) states that 2k1 − 1 > p p mm
12 −  > 2k2 − 1 for
every atom m ; it disqualifies capacity points (k1,k2) exhibiting a too large differential. The reduced
form of the condition reads  k2 > gn(k1) where each gn is an increasing and convex function. Figure
6 The skeptical reader will be convinced of the necessity to rely on numerical computations by noting that for a 5 atoms
equilibrium, a system of 8 equations involving polynomials of degree 7 with more than 1500 monomials has to be
solved.14
9 displays those functions for n = 2,  3, 4 and 5,  k1 varying between 0.5 and 0.95 (the limit at k1 = 1
is studied below). As n increases, more inequalities have to be satisfied, more capacity points are
eliminated and the area where atomic equilibrium  exist shrinks ; hence those functions satisfy g2 <
g3 < g4 < g5.
Figure 9
The second necessary condition is related to the upper bound on prices ; it links the upper
prices of the distributions to the reservation price by p p nn
12 +  < 2S − 1. Since the equilibrium prices
do not critically depend on the capacity differential but on the total capacity, we study this condition
on the diagonal. For a given symmetric capacity choice (k,k), we compute the symmetric candidate
equilibrium p k m mn
() ()
≤









. The inverse of this function gives us the maximal capacity KS n
max( ) such that
points (k1,k2) with k1+k2 ≤ 2.KS n
max( ) have an n atoms price equilibrium at the given S. Those
functions will be useful in the subsequent section.
As one can expect, the larger the capacities, the larger the prices in a candidate equilibrium.
In fact, our computations shows that the upper prices of a candidate equilibrium tend to infinity as
capacities tend to (1,1). Now, since lemma 1 showed that prices are bounded by ρ() kS k j j ≡− + 1 ,
capacity choices around the corner (1,1) have no atomic price equilibria ; for that reason the plot of
figure 9 can safely stop at k1 = 0.95. ♦15
5) The capacity game
Going backward is difficult in the game G because G(k1,k2) has often several price equilibria
as shown in proposition 4. The focal subgame perfect equilibrium of this model involves symmetric
choices by the firms which happen to be identical to that of a monopoly owner of both firms : the
market is shared evenly, there is no excess of capacity, global surplus is maximised and consumer
surplus is minimised.
Theorem 1
For almost nil capacity cost, two kinds of SPE coexists
i) The total capacity exactly covers the market and each firm enjoys a minimum share;
furthermore, the price equilibrium is in pure strategies.
ii) The total capacity exceed the market size,  the difference in the capacity choices is limited
and the price equilibrium is in completely mixed strategies.
Proof  i) Equilibria with exact market coverage
The following characterisation is valid for any capacity cost ε. Using the symmetry of the
game, we take attention to SPE where the choices of capacities are (m,1−m) with m ≥ 1/2. The profit
function of firm 1 and 2 is (S − ε − k)k  which apply on the intervals  0;m []  and  0 1 ; − [] m




therefore an upper limit to m in order to deter downward deviations. Note that for large S, this limit
is in fact not binding.
An upwards deviation k1 > m by firm 1 can only lead to a price equilibrium of type B or C.
There is no possibility for a type A equilibrium because it requires both capacities to be large and
since m ≥ 1/2, the capacity choice of firm 2 is smaller than the required limit Φ(,/) S1 2 (cf. figure 7
for a graphical explanation and lemma 3 in appendix for the computation of this limit). To deter this
upward deviation of firm 1, we define the continuation price equilibrium of G(k1,1 − m) to be of
type B in order for the net profit of firm 1 to be (S −m)m − εk1 ; this is a non profitable deviation
because of the supplementary cost of capacity. As mixed strategies enable large prices, type C
equilibria provide too large payoffs and cannot be used to sustain our candidate SPE.
If m < Φ(,/) S1 2, an upwards deviation k2 > 1 − m by firm 2 can only be followed by a type
B or C equilibrium and we apply the same trick as for firm 1 to deter this upward deviation. A
problem appears for very large m's because firm 2's payoff is almost nil, hence she has an incentive
to deviate to the large capacity Φ(,/) S1 2 in order to play the Hotelling price equilibrium and earn a
net profit of 1/2 − εΦ(,/) S1 2. Whenever ε is less than half (the relevant condition for the original
Hotelling model), the solution of the equation 1 21 2 1 1 /( , / ) ( ) −= − − + [] − εε Φ S S m m  give us a
bound on m which is obviously less than one. We may conclude that any sharing of the market is a
SPE allocation as long as each firm obtains its "Hotelling profit".16
ii) Equilibria involving overlapping capacities when capacity cost is almost nil
Consider a candidate SPE outcome (m1,m2). To prove that it is not a SPE, we must consider
deviation to (m1,k2) or (k1,m2) and look at the worst price equilibrium for the deviant ; if the
deviation is still profitable then (m1,m2) is not a SPE.
Claim If (m1,m2) is such that no type C equilibria exists in G(m1,m2), then this choice is not part of
a SPE.
Proof If the price equilibrium in G(m1,m2) is of type A, firms earn a profit independant of their
capacity choices. Therefore, each has an incentive to reduce capacity since the cost ε is positive
(almost nil is exactly what is needed). If the price equilibrium is of type B, the payoff of one firm,
say i, in the pricing game is Πd
j m ( ) ; by choosing ki = 1 − mj, firm i sets herself in a non
overlapping situation and achieves (S −1+ mj)(1 − mj) = Πd
j m ( ) with a lower cost of capacity
installation, thus she will deviate.
This artifice is our main instrument to rule out "unwanted" equilibria ; we also obtain a first
result : there are no SPE of type ii) where the capacity point (k1,k2) fall outside of the lens displayed
on figure 9 above.
We now build an SPE with capacity choices (m1,m2) such that the equilibrium of G(m1,m2)
is an n atom one. This couple must satisfy m2 > gn(m1) (by symmetry of G, we can always assume
m1 < m2) and m1 + m2 < 2KS n
max( ) ; those conditions give an upper bound on capacities. We now
define the strategies out of the equilibrium path : at (ki,mj), we define pricing strategies to be the
pure strategy γ(ki,mj) for firm j while firm i mixes between ρ(mj) and the lower price 
1
2
+γ(, ) km ij
(type B equilibrium). Firm i obtains Πd(mj) and to deter the deviation ki, it must be less than
Πn(m1,m2), the profit accruing to firm i at the n atom equilibrium.
Since this latter function mostly depends on the total capacity, we may study this condition
















1 . The numerical computation is performed for ε = 0 as we
are studying the case of almost nil capacity cost. Then, we can invert S k n
max(,) 0  to obtain a lower
bound  KS n
min( ) on capacities which is compatible with the upper bound KS n
max( ) derived in
proposition 4 (the above simplification is therefore valid up to small numerical errors).
Contrarily to type i) SPE, the capacity combinations that appear as SPE of type ii) depend on
S. Figure 10 summarises our result : the various KS n
min( ) and KS n
max( ) functions are plotted for n =
2, 3, 4 and 5. Consider for example S = 4. There exists a symmetrical7 SPE with a 2 atoms price
equilibrium if the capacity is between .81 and .85 and an SPE with a 3 atoms price equilibrium if the
7 Whenever a symmetrical  n-atom equilibrium exists, there also exists asymmetrical  ones for all capcity choices with
the same mean and satisfying mi > gn(mj) i.e., the capacity point must lie in the lens of figure 9.17






If the cost for capacity is larger than 1/4 of the transportation cost, then in all SPE, the
market is exactly covered by the capacity choices of the firms.
Proof  We have shown that a type ii) SPE exists for the symmetric capacity k only if
S kS S k nn
min max () (,) ≤≤ ε . As the latter function is decreasing in ε,  S kS k nn
min max () (,) =ε  has a
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The εn functions satisfy ε2 > ε3 > ε4 > ε5 and are plotted with reversed axes on figure 11




Note that in the SPE's involving exact market coverage, both firms are on their monopolist's
profit curve. This perfectly illustrates how firms may benefit from capacity precommitment. Indeed,
the basic feature of the Hotelling model lies in the fact that firms enjoy local monopolies around
their locations. However, in the absence of capacity constraints, they cannot prevent price
competition to take place. Although positive mark-ups are preserved in equilibrium, price
competition is damaging to the firms. This is clearly seen by observing that in the Hotelling
equilibrium, prices do not depend on S. In other words, firms fail to capture a large part of the
consumers' surplus.
The main virtue of capacity precommitment is precisely to avoid this failure. Indeed, through
capacity precommitment, firms are now able to capture the greatest part of the consumers' surplus.
In the most "natural" equilibrium in which both firms commit to a capacity of 1/2, they sell exactly
the same quantity than in the original Hotelling equilibrium, but at much higher prices. In particular,
their payoffs now depend positively on S. This is so because they move along their local monopoly
profit curve which is increasing in the reservation price S.
The existence of equilibria involving excess capacities is mainly due to the existence of
multiple equilibria in the price subgame where firms fight for market shares. However, it remains
true that in these equilibria, prices are always above the Hotelling prices and increase with S. The
corresponding payoffs are also positively linked to the reservation price. Finally, theorem 2 shows
that excess capacity is profitable only if installation costs are low.
Thus,  whatever the equilibrium considered, we are led to conclude that capacity
precommitment enables firms to take advantage of the most profitable feature of the industry which
is its local monopoly structure.19
6) Cournot Competition
Kreps & Scheinkman [83] established that firms tend to avoid destructive price competition
through capacity precommitment, in the market for an homogenous product.  In theorem 1 and 2, we
have extended their result to the case of horizontal differentiation. Although product differentiation
by itself relaxes price competition, we have shown that firms still have an incentive to relax it
further through capacity precommitment. The nicest feature of the Kreps & Scheinkman [83] result
is that it provides a theoretical foundation for Cournot competition which allows for an explicit price
mechanism. We now show that the same is true for horizontally differentiated products.
Theorem 3
The equilibrium allocations of the Cournot competition in the Hotelling model are those
of the capacity precommitment game for ε > 1/4.
Proof In the Cournot game, firm supply quantities q1 and q2 to an otherwise competitive market. If
the proposed quantities q1 and q2 do no cover the market, there is excess demand and the prices
increase until supply equal demand on each side of the market i.e., q1 = S − p1 and q2 = S − p2. As
already studied in proposition 2, this situation is unstable since at least one firm has an incentive to
increase its quantity above the complement of the other. If now the proposed quantities q1 and q2
exceed the market size, there is excess supply and at least one of the price, say p1, must be nil on
this competitive market. Therefore firm 1 has a profitable deviation by offering a quantity slightly
less than 1 − q2 to be on its monopoly profit curve.
The remaining candidates for a Cournot equilibrium are (q, 1 − q) with q ≤ 1/2. The
competitive8 prices are S − q and S − 1 + q. Without loss of generality, firm 1 offers q, thus sells
less than 1/2 in equilibrium. Hence, p1 cannot be nil because it would attract at least one half of the
consumers, thereby implying an excess demand. Firm 2 cannot profitably deviate to a larger quantity
than 1 − q because she would face a zero price (one price is nil and by the preceding argument, it
must be her's).
Firm 1 may however profitably deviate to some Q larger than q but still less than 1/2. Since
there is excess supply, p2 is nil, thus firm 1 sells all of Q and the consumer located at x = Q must
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22 SS −− − − − εε ε () ()  > 0. Finally, the Cournot equilibria feature exact market coverage (q, 1 −
q) with q larger than this lower bound9 q*.
8 For exact market coverage, there exists a continüm of prices which clear the market and they need not be the highest
possible ones (cf. the forthcoming Grilo & Mertens [97] for a foundation of our price selection).
9 This lower bound is different from that derived in theorem 1 but both are small so that our equivalence applies for the
most likely sharings of the market.20












, d'Aspremont & Motta [94]
define a Cournot equilibrium as a price and a quantity vectors (pc,qc) such that for each firm i,
( , ) argmax( ) pq p q cc
i i ∈− ε  over  p q D p q D p ii jj ≥≤ ≤ = {} 00 , ( ), ( ) . In our setting, the constraint
qD p jj = ()  means that firm i optimises over the complement to firm j's capacity. Again, according
to this alternative definition, all SPE's involving exact market coverage are Cournot equilibria. ♦
7) Final comments
Let us discuss now the main assumptions we have made.
i) It is well known that the nature of the rationing rule plays a central role in pricing models with
capacity constraints. For instance, Davidson & Deneckere [86] show that the result of Kreps &
Scheinkman entirely rests on their assumption of efficient rationing. It is however intuitive that this
is not the case in the present analysis. Indeed, any alternative to the efficient rule would result in a
lower residual demand addressed to the "high" price firm. However, the local monopoly structure of
the model does not depend on the rationing rule. Therefore, it is intuitive that other rationing rules
would yield more stability into price competition and would make exact market coverage equilibria
more likely. Moreover, in our setting, the efficient rationing rule may be considered as a rather
natural one if one views the Hotelling model as a spatial model. In this case, it basically amounts to
organise rationing on a "first arrived-first served" basis.
ii) We consider a market in which the location of firms are fixed at the extremities of the market. As
mentioned previously, this assumption was motivated by its implications for price competition.
Since product differentiation is maximised, one could think that this is the case where the firms have
the lowest incentives to further relax price competition. The robustness of our result to alternative
location patterns is not easy to trace. In particular because no pure strategy equilibrium exists in the
Hotelling model without capacity constraints when firms are located inside the first and third
quartiles. (see Osborne & Pitchick [87] for a characterisation of mixed strategies equilibria). Two
remarks are in order here.
First, it should be noted that the presence of capacity constraints may help to restore the
Hotelling equilibrium for locations inside the first and third quartiles (see Wauthy [96]). At the same
time, inside locations will tend to make upward deviations less profitable, because it could imply
less favourable residual demands. We may therefore suspect that with inside locations, there is less
scope for excess capacity choices whereas exact market coverage remains most attractive.
Second, under quadratic transportation costs,  maximal differentiation has been shown to be
optimal for the firms. Although our results has been derived using linear transportation costs, it is
clear their qualitative features do not depend on this particular assumption.21
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Appendices
Lemma 3
The cut-off between aggressive pricing and monopoly behaviour.





























 while that associated with the security strategy ρ(k2) is
Πd kSk k () ( ) 22 2 11 ≡− + [] − .
Since this latter function is decreasing,
we have k2 > k'2 on figure 11 below.
The best reply of firm 1 to a low price
p2 is the default option ρ(k2) and above the
threshold x, the optimal play becomes H(.).
For the smaller capacity k'2, the cut-off value












 The solution of ΠΠ d kp () () 2 1 2 =  is  x Sk k ≡− + [] −− 81 1 1 22 ( ) , while that of













Observe first that if S is too small then x is negative and the security strategy  is never used ;
second the bound x is useful for large values of k2 as Πd is decreasing. Thus we have to solve in k2

























, we obtain the best reply function of firm 1 as
BRp
ki f p k k
Max H p a k p if p k k
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For the complete characterisation of
the pricing game, we need to solve
γ(, ) kk 12 1 <  i.e.,  k S k and y 21 1 << {} Λ(, )  
or k S k and x 21 1 ≥< {} Λ(, )  .
When  γ(, ) kk 12  = y, we solve 1 >
2k1 − 1 +  
Sk k
k
−+ [] − 11 22
1
( )
  and we get




11 −+ − − SS k k ( )
.
Note that Φ(S,k1) < k2 < Λ(S,k1) make












When γ = x, we solve  81 1 1 1 22 Sk k −+ [] −− < ( )  and we obtain k2 > Φ(,/) S1 2. The
combination of the two sets of solutions leads to the shaded area of figure 12. Note also that
S SS S S S >⇒ −≥− () ⇒−+ −≥⇒ ≥
3
2
21 2 2 1 1 2
1
2
2 2 2 Φ( , / )  which is used in theorem 1 part i).
♦
Lemma 4
In a mixed equilibrium firms use the same number of atoms and the diagonal points lie
in the band.
Proof Let Fi be the cumulative function of the mixed strategy used by firm i in equilibrium. Its
support is included in [1;ρ(kj)] . The choice of α  on figure 13 is made in order that D2(p1,.) is
decreasing and concave over [0;α] for any price p1 (we want to avoid the lower triangle where D2 is
again constant which precludes the concavity of Π2). Over [0;α], every profit function Π2(p1,.) is
concave, so is their average Π2(F1,.) and thus the best reply of firm 2 to F1 in the interval [0;α] is
unique which means that F2 possesses at most one atom p
2 in [0;α].24
Now,  ω is chosen so that
D1(p2,.) is non-increasing over [0;ω]
for any price p2 larger than α (this
time, we want to avoid the upper
triangle). Thus the average of the
profit function Π1 conditional on
pp 2 2 ≠  is concave.
Π1(p
2,.) may be non-
concave over [0;ω] since the shape
of the demand function changes at
p1 = υ, however it is concave over












Thus, Π1(F2,.) as the average of the two previous profit functions, is concave over [0;υ] and
over [υ;ω] and has a unique maximum on each interval. We conclude that the best reply of firm 1
over [0;ω] possesses at most two atoms pp
1 1  and  .
We will now repeat this argument. Observe that β is such that D2(p1,.) is non-increasing over
[0;β] for any price p1 larger than ω, thus the average of the profit function Π2 conditional on
pp p 1 1 1 ≠  and   is concave. The existence of those two atoms means that Π2(F1,.) has at most 3
maximisers on [0;β] so that F2 possesses at most 3 atoms over [0;β]. Proceeding in the same way,
we see that F1 has at most 4 atoms over [0;θ], that F2 has at most 5 atoms over [0;γ]. This process
eventually10 reaches the limits ρ(k1) and ρ(k2). Hence, we have proven that a mixed strategy
equilibrium involves a finite number of atoms for each firm.
To prove the second part of the lemma, we use the table of points formed by the distributions
pm
1 () ≥ m1
 and  pn
2 () ≥ n1
 (cf. figure 14) ; we speak of lines when p1 is fixed, of columns when p2 is




We claim that the pair  pp
12 , ()  of minimal atoms lie in the band (cf. point α on figure 14).
Indeed, if pp k
12 1 12 ≤− +, the whole line  pp m
m 1 2 1
, ()
≥
 lies under the band and we get D1(F2,.) = k1,
thus Π1(F2,.) is locally increasing which means that p
1 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Likewise,
if  pp k
12 2 12 ≥+ − , the column  pp m
m 1 2 1
, ()
≥
 would lie in the area where D2 = k2 and Π2(F1,.)
would be locally increasing at p
2.















The same reasoning enables to show that any line and any column has a point in the band.
Whatever the position of the atoms above α in the α−β  column,  Π2(F1,.) is concave up to
q p k 2 1 1 12 ≡+ − . Knowing that this function has a unique maximiser over [0;q2] and that it is
precisely  p
2, the second atom of F2,  p2, must be larger than q2 so that ω =  pp
1 2 , ()  is under the
band. Likewise β =  pp 1 2 , ()  is above the band, however,  pp 12 , ()  could be either χ, δ or ε. If it were
χ, then the ω−χ column would have no point in the band and Π2(F1,.) would be locally increasing at
p2. Likewise, if it were ε, the β−ε line would have no point in the band. Repetition of this argument
shows that for every integer m, p p mm
12 , ()  lies in the band. As a corollary, there must be the same
number of atoms in each distribution. ♦
Lemma 5
The nature of the equilibria with n atoms in the pricing game.
Proof  Consider the distributions  pmm
11 ,μ () ≤ mn
 and  pmm
22 ,μ () ≤ mn
 of an equilibrium with n atoms on
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. The same first order condition for firm 2 at her jth atom leads to
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We also have the n corresponding equations for the prices charged by firm 2. Having

























 and the 2n − 2 equations
system is obtained by equating profit for each firm at each of the atoms she plays in equilibrium i.e.




























2 .  The equality between the number of unknowns and the
number of equations tells us that there is a finite number of solutions. Except for the 2-atoms case
(cf. lemma 4), we have not been able to check unicity, thus the following algorithm is only an
equilibrium selection, not the equilibrium correspondence.
It must be noted that all equations are fractional and can thus be reduced to polynomial
equations with a maximum exponent of 7 (independently of n). Furthermore, if we count k1 and k2
as variables, each equation contains 60 monomials for n = 2, 247 for n = 3, 686 for n = 4 and 1533
for n = 5. It must be noted that even for n = 2, the Mathematica software is not able to solve this




2 μn , profit μ21
2 nn p ( )  decreases with μ2
n, thus by choosing μ1
n and μ2
n nearby 1 i.e. u
near 0, we obtain X(u) << 0. The first order Taylor expansion of the differentiable function X is
X(u+du) = X(u) + dX.du where dX is the jacobian of X evaluated at u. We approach a solution by
following the path of optimal growth i.e., we choose du = - δ.(dX)-1.X(u) where δ is chosen to
enable a rapid but certain convergence of the numerical computation. ♦27
Lemma 6
A more thorough analysis of the two atoms price equilibrium
Proof  For a two atoms equilibrium with prices  pp
i i , ()  and probability distribution (, ) μμ i i 1− , the




















































, (E3) reads 33 4 2 pk k
i jj ii =+ + ββ  and defines a function
Gk k ijij (,,,) ββ  and while (E4) becomes 3
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(,,), C < 0 ⇒ only one positive solution
By symmetry for firm j, we get βj = f(βi,kj,ki). It is now clear that an equilibrium of the
pricing game is a fixed point of f fk kk k ij ji (., , ), , () . Since pp
i i   <    and profits are equal, it must be
true that μi > 1/2, thus βj < 1 and symmetrically βi < 1. Those supplementary conditions are helpful
to analyse the large capacity case. Observe that, independently of the capacities, if βj tends to 0, the












[] = . Its positive solution diverges and by
symmetry, we obtain fk k iji
i
(,,) β
β→ ⎯→ ⎯⎯ +∞
0 . Now, since βj is bounded,
C kjj kj
=− − ⎯ → ⎯⎯
→ 41 0











in the preceding result, we see that βj = f(βi,kj,ki) diverges, a contradiction with the constraint βj < 1.
We can therefore undertake numerical computations without worrying about the behaviour at
the corner (1,1). As f is analytically known, we have been able to compute the roots of
f fk kk k ij ji (., , ), , ()  for a lattice of capacities such that ki + kj > 1 ; it appears that this function is28
always decreasing, thus there is at most one equilibrium. Moreover, the conditions provided by
lemma 4 enable us to eliminate couples with high capacity differential ; figure 15 plots the lower
contour curve  of the capacities area where the equilibrium exists.
Figure 15
Our computations show that the upper prices  p and p i j     increase with capacities so that the
condition  pk Sk ij j ≤= − + ρ() 1  is violated for large capacities i.e., the point  pp i j , ()  leaves the
"band" as described in lemma 2. Consequently, atomic equilibrium will never exist for capacities
around 1. ♦29